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ABSTRACT
Ransomware can prevent a user from accessing a device and its
files until a ransom is paid to the attacker, most frequently in Bit-
coin. With over 500 known ransomware families, it has become
one of the dominant cybercrime threats for law enforcement, se-
curity professionals and the public. However, a more comprehen-
sive, evidence-based picture on the global direct financial impact
of ransomware attacks is still missing. In this paper, we present
a data-driven method for identifying and gathering information
on Bitcoin transactions related to illicit activity based on foot-
prints left on the public Bitcoin blockchain. We implement this
method on-top-of the GraphSense open-source platform and ap-
ply it to empirically analyze transactions related to 35 ransomware
families. We estimate the lower bound direct financial impact of
each ransomware family and find that, from 2013 to mid-2017,
the market for ransomware payments has a minimum worth of
USD 12,768,536 (22,967.54 BTC). We also find that the market is
highly skewed with only a few number of players responsible for
the majority of the payments. Based on these research findings,
policy-makers and law enforcement agencies can use the statistics
provided to understand the size of the illicit market and make in-
formed decisions on how best to address the threat.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Ransomware attacks have eclipsed most other cybercrime threats
and have become the dominant concern for law enforcement and
security professionals in many nations (cf. [8, 31, 34]). The device
of ransomware victims are infected by a class of malicious soft-
ware that, when installed on a computer, prevents a user from ac-
cessing the device — usually through unbreakable encryption —
until a ransom is paid to the attacker. In this type of attack, cy-
bercriminals do not profit from the resale of stolen information on
underground markets to willing buyers, but from the value victims
assign to their locked data and their willingness to pay a nominal
fee to regain access to them. To that extent, the business model
of ransomware seems conducive to more favorable monetizing op-
portunities than other forms of cybercrimes, due to its scalable po-
tential and the removal of intermediaries.
Prominent recent ransomware examples are Locky, SamSam, or
WannaCry, the latter infected up to 300,000 victims in 150 coun-
tries [8]. Like other ransomware, these families focus on extorting
money from victims and thus raise fear and concern among po-
tential victims who see the attack as a direct intimidation [10]. At
The 17th Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), June 2018,
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the time of writing, there are 5051 known ransomware families de-
tected and almost all of them demand payments in Bitcoin [27],
which is the most prominent cryptocurrency.
Yet, global and reliable statistics on the impact of cybercrime in
general, and ransomware in particular, are missing, causing a large
misunderstanding regarding the severity of the threat and the ex-
tent to which it fuels a large illicit business. Most of the statistics
available on cybercrime and ransomware are produced by private
corporations (cf. [29, 38, 39]) that do not disclose their underlying
methodologies and have incentives to over- or underreport them
since they sell cybersecurity products and services that are sup-
posed to protect their users against such threats [23]. Also, both
cybercrime and ransomware attacks take place in many regions of
the world and reporting the prevalence of the threat on a global
level is difficult, especially when it involves a blend of fairly so-
phisticated technologies that may not be familiar to a large num-
ber of law enforcement organizations [23, 37]. This is unfortunate
because the lack of reliable statistics prevents policy-makers and
practitioners from understanding the true scope of the problem,
the size of the illicit market it fuels and prevents them from being
able to make informed decisions on how best to address it, as well
as to determine what levels of resources is needed to control it.
But ransomware offers a unique opportunity to quantify at least
the direct financial impact of such threat: ransomware payments
are transferred in Bitcoin, which is a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency
with a public transaction ledger — known as blockchain — that is
shared among peers. When ransomware payments can be identi-
fied correctly, the Bitcoin blockchain provides a reliable basis on
which to assess ransomware cash flows. Furthermore, a number of
clustering heuristics (cf. [20, 22, 32]) have been proposed that sup-
port partitioning the set of Bitcoin addresses observed in the entire
cryptocurrency ecosystem into maximal subsets, which are likely
controlled by the same real-world actor. Previous studies havemea-
sured ransomware payments in the ecosystem, but focused on a
single ransomware family (CryptoLocker [19]), did notmake use of
known clustering heuristics [17] or, at the time of this writing, dis-
closed limited information on their underlying methodology [4].
In order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the global
direct financial impact of ransomware attacks, we propose a data-
driven method for identifying and gathering information on Bit-
coin transactions related to ransomware and then apply this
method for 35 ransomware families. More specifically, the contri-
butions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a data-driven method for identifying and gath-
ering Bitcoin transactions, related to ransomware attacks,
that goes beyond known clustering heuristics.
1https://id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com/
• We implement this method on-top-of the open-source
GraphSense cryptocurrency analytics platform2 and make
the transaction extraction3 and analytics procedures4
openly available.
• We apply the method on a sample of 35 different ran-
somware families and find new addresses related to each
ransomware family, distinguish collectors from payment
addresses and, when possible, track where the money is
cashed out.
• We quantify the lower direct financial impact of each ran-
somware family, show how ransom payments evolve over
time and find that from 2013 to mid-2017, the market for
ransomware payments for 35 families sums to a minimum
amount of USD 12,768,536 (22,967.54 BTC).
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to present a method
to assess payments of a large number of ransomware families in
Bitcoin and to provide a lower bound for their direct financial
impacts, while being openly available and reproducible. Our pro-
posed method and findings also roughly correspond with concur-
rent research reported in Bursztein et al. [4] and Huang et al. [15].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we provide
further details on ransomware and traceability of Bitcoin transac-
tions in Section 2. Our methodology for identifying and gathering
Bitcoin transactions is described in Section 3 and the results of our
study is presented in Section 4. The discussion follows in Section 5
along with the conclusion in Section 6.
2 STATE OF THE ART
2.1 Ransomware
The concept of extorting money from user devices through mali-
cious means has had a long existence, such as fake anti-virus that
forced users to buy a software to erase an inexistent malware from
their devices [11, 31, 35]. Still, ransomware is a criminal innovation
that seeks to monetize illegally accessed information by charging
its rightful owner a ransom — usually a few hundred dollars — to
recover the personal files that have a unique sentimental or admin-
istrative value.
Nowadays, two modes of attacks have been used by ran-
somware authors to prevent file access on a device. The first mode
of attack aims at locking out a user from a device by disabling the
operating system (OS). When the user starts the device, a ransom
note appears requesting money to be transferred for the device to
start as usual [11, 35]. The second mode of attack is more sophisti-
cated and uses cryptography. The technique is to encrypt a user’s
files on a device before requesting a ransom in exchange for the
key that will decrypt them [35].
Since the first implementation of encryption as an attack tech-
nique, other technologies have been leveraged to increase the ef-
ficiency of new variants of ransomware. The Onion Routing (Tor)
Protocol has allowed ransomware attackers to use an anonymous
and direct communication channel with their victims. The use
of cryptocurrencies for ransom payments has enabled relatively
2http://graphsense.info/
3https://github.com/behas/ransomware-dataset
4https://github.com/behas/ransomware-analytics
anonymous money exchanges, while evading the control of estab-
lished financial institutions and their law enforcement partners.
The combination of strong and well-implemented cryptographic
techniques to take files hostage, the Tor protocol to communicate
anonymously, and the use of a cryptocurrency to receive unmedi-
ated payments provide altogether a high level of impunity for ran-
somware attackers [30].
Many argue that ransomware authors have proved to be highly
innovative in the past years. Since 2013 and the first introduction
of the Cryptolocker ransomware, new variants have been designed
and distributed by ambitious cybercriminals, building on the suc-
cess of previous versions or fixing previous errors [11, 17, 31]. Yet,
focusing on the speed at which ransomware authors modify their
malware and the technologies used may lead to overestimate the
severity of the threat.
As the current hype would have it, ransomware authors would
make large amounts of money — up to millions of dollars — with
this successful online black mailing activity [2, 14, 29]. As it is
often the case, the reality is not that simple. In 2015, Kharraz et
al. [17] published a long-term study on ransomware attacks in
which they analyzed 1,359 samples from 15 ransomware families.
Even though ransomware has evolved, these authors found that
the number of families with sophisticated destructive capabilities re-
mains quite small. They also found that malware authors mostly
used superficial techniques to encrypt or delete a victim’s files.
Flaws were, moreover, found in the code, making the attack easily
defeated. Similarly, Gazet [10] conducted a comparative analysis of
15 ransomware and discovered that the code used was often basic
and built on high-level languages. Looking at the victims and the
ransoms asked, the author concluded that ransomware attackers
followed a low-cost/low-risk business model: they did not aim at
mass extortion, but relied instead on small attacks for small ran-
soms, which could be compensated by mass propagation.
Moreover, although ransomware was perceived, at first, as a de-
structive form of attack almost impossible to prevent and detect,
many initiatives led by the security community have tempered this
initial assessment [17]. For example, Kharraz et al. [16], Scaife et
al. [33], Song et al. [35], Continella et al. [5] and Kolodenker et
al. [18] all developed tools to detect ransomware-like behaviors
and prevent them from successfully encrypting a device. These
tools help mitigate ransomware attacks, minimizing the potential
damages caused by this threat. The ransomware threat is thus cer-
tainly evolving and growing, but is not out of control. The com-
munity keeps finding ways to detect and block it preemptively.
Moreover, when a user is infected, an international initiative called
"No More Ransom!"5 provides decryption tools for victims of ran-
somware. These toolswere developed by exploiting technical flaws
in malware implementations and, at the moment, more than 40 of
them are available on the website for different ransomware strains.
2.2 Bitcoin Traceability Research
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency initially introduced by
Satoshi Nakamoto (a pseudonym) in 2008 [27]. It can be used to
execute pseudo-anonymous payments globally within a short pe-
riod of time and — at least before the enormous rise in popularity
5https://www.nomoreransom.org/
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at the end of 2017 —with comparably low transaction costs. All ex-
ecuted and confirmed financial transactions are stored in a shared
and transparent ledger, known as the blockchain, which is publicly
accessible. Each transaction is represented by a list of inputs point-
ing back to outputs and a list of outputs, each reflecting an amount
of Bitcoins transferred to a specific recipient’s address. A Bitcoin
address is an alphanumeric string derived from the public key of
an asymmetric key pair generated by a Bitcoin user. Every user
can hold multiple key pairs (and addresses) in a wallet, and is en-
couraged to use a new address for each transaction to increase the
level of anonymity.
A number of heuristics have been developed to analyze transac-
tions and group all addresses in the Bitcoin blockchain into maxi-
mal subsets (clusters) that can be associated with some real-world
actors. Themultiple-inputheuristics [27, 32] takes into account that
two addresses used as inputs in the same transaction must be con-
trolled by the same real-world actor. If one input address is used in
another transaction along with other input addresses, they can all
be linked to the same real-world actor. Cluster identification can
further be refined by applying change heuristics [3, 20, 36], which
exploit the concept of "change addresses" in Bitcoin. If one pays 1.5
BTC for a service, but has an address with 2 BTC, the remaining
0.5 BTC will be sent back to the user using what is defined as a
"change address".
When clusters are correlated with attribution data (tags) from
external sources, such as publicly available information in forums
(cf. [9]) or specific sites (e.g., blockchain.info, walletexplorer.org),
it is possible to deanonymize large fractions of the entire Bitcoin
transaction network. Clustering of Bitcoin addresses and tagging
addresses with attribution data are two central features that are
nowadays supported by modern cryptocurrency analytics tools
(e.g., Chainalysis, Elliptic, GraphSense).
Applying these strategies on public transactions turns Bitcoin
into — at most — a pseudo-anonymous currency, in which mone-
tary flows can be traced from one known or unknown address to
another. These strategies can identify Bitcoin addresses and clus-
ters related to illicit activities, unless one makes use of mixing or
CoinJoin services. Mixing Services — also known as tumblers —
are specialized intermediaries that break the link between senders
and receivers by mixing coins and transactions with those of other
users (c.f. [26]). A CoinJoin transaction, on the other hand, is a
special transaction in which multiple senders and recipients of
funds combine their payments in a single aggregated transaction.
This requires a dedicated service (e.g., JoinMarket) that matches in-
terested users and supports them in creating the transaction [25].
Both types of services facilitate the amalgamation of coins belong-
ing to multiple individuals in a single transaction, making the trac-
ing of illicit activity more difficult.
The effectiveness of clustering heuristics has been investigated
by Nick [28], who assessed the well-known multiple-input clus-
tering heuristics on a ground-truth dataset of approximately 37K
wallets and found that such a clustering algorithm can guess, on
average, 68.59% of all addresses belonging to a wallet. Building on
that, Harrigan and Fretter [12] concluded that address clustering in
the Bitcoin network was effective due to identified address reuse
and the existence of superclusters with incremental growth (e.g.,
exchanges, gambling sites, darknet marketplaces).
2.3 Tracing Bitcoin Transactions related to
Ransomware
A ransomware attacker who requests payments in Bitcoin will
broadcast a Bitcoin address to which the victim needs to send
money to. This address is a ransom payment address from which
clustering heuristics in the Bitcoin network can be computed.
Three previous studies have investigated ransomware activity in
the Bitcoin network. Kharraz et al. [17] analyzed 1,872 Bitcoin ad-
dresses related to the CryptoLocker ransomware. They concluded
that Bitcoin addresses related to Cryptolocker had similar transac-
tion records, such as a short activity period and a few numbers of
small transactions. In total, 84% of the addresses analyzed had no
more than six transactions and 69% were active for less than 10
days. Liao et al. [19] also performed a measurement analysis of the
Cryptolocker ransomware. They started their investigation with
two Bitcoin addresses and generated a cluster of 968 addresses.
They filtered transactions based on ransom amounts and time and
provided a lower and upper bound for Cryptolocker’s economy.
They mentioned that possible connections exist between this ran-
somware and Bitcoin services, such as Bitcoin Fog and BTC-e, and
other cybercrime activities, like darknet markets. Finally, a concur-
rent research reported in Bursztein et al. [4] and Huang et al. [15]
traced Bitcoin transactions of several ransomware families. The re-
search estimated that about USD 16million ransomware payments
were made with Bitcoins over a two-year period.
This study goes beyond the state of the art on ransomware
and Bitcoin traceability research by presenting a simple automated
method, built on known clustering heuristics, to systematically
trace monetary flows. It applies the method on Bitcoin transac-
tions related to 35 ransomware families to identify, quantify and
compare their financial activity in the Bitcoin network.
3 METHODOLOGY
In the following section, we describe how we identify, collect, and
filter payments related to ransomware attacks by analyzing the Bit-
coin blockchain.
3.1 Seed Dataset Collection
To begin, Bitcoin addresses related to ransomware attacks were
collected from various sources. A total of 7,037 addresses related
to the Locky ransomware were provided to us by theAnti-Phishing
Working Group (APWG)6 . An additional 139 Bitcoin addresses
were found in a thread maintained by Michael Gillepsi7. Through
additional online searches, 46 Bitcoin addresses were found in
various sources, such as security researchers’ blogs or websites
of organizations analyzing ransomware activity. In total, we ex-
tracted 7,222 Bitcoin addresses related to 67 ransomware families.
Throughout the whole study, we refer to them as seed addresses
because they are the ones used to generate the larger dataset.
3.2 Bitcoin Network Construction
We extracted transaction data from the Bitcoin blockchain using
the GraphSense open-source platform. Our most recent expansion
6https://www.antiphishing.org/
7Michael Gillepsi is the creator of the initiative : https://id-ransomware.
malwarehunterteam.com/
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ran on October 28th, 2017 with 489,181 blocks, 260,167,622 trans-
actions and 312,506,384 addresses.
In order to trace monetary flows, we computed two types of
network representations over the entire blockchain: the address
graph, in which each vertex represents a Bitcoin address and each
directed edge represents the aggregated set of transactions trans-
ferring value from one address to another. For each directed edge
we computed summary statistics, such as the number of transac-
tions and the estimated value flow between two addresses, con-
sidering the daily Bitcoin/USD closing price as conversion rates.
The technical details of these computations are described in more
details in an earlier paper [13]. Moreover, transaction outputs con-
taining explicit change addresses (i.e., addresses that were also ref-
erenced by one of the inputs within the same transaction), were
removed to eliminate monetary flows having the same address as
source and destination.
The second type of network representation is the cluster graph.
To compute this graph, we partitioned the set of addresses ob-
served in the entire blockchain into maximal subsets (clusters) that
are likely to be controlled by the same real-world actor using the
well-known [32] and efficient [12]multiple-input clustering heuris-
tics. The underlying intuition is that if two addresses (i.e.: A and B)
are used as inputs in the same transaction while one of these ad-
dresses along with another address (i.e: B and C) are used as inputs
in another transaction, then the three addresses (A, B and C) must
somehow be controlled by the same real-world actor [20], who
conducted both transactions and therefore possesses the private
keys corresponding to all three addresses. In the cluster graph, the
nodes represent address clusters and the directed edges represent
transactions between clusters. Since each cluster represents an ag-
gregation of addresses, the edges between clusters can be seen as
an aggregation of each transaction value taking into account USD
conversion rates.
In order to associate real-world actors, such as Bitcoin ex-
changes or gambling sites, with addresses and clusters, we gather
publicly available information, so-called tags, from two main ex-
ternal sources: walletexplorer.com and blockchain.info. Each tag
associates a specific Bitcoin address with some contextually rele-
vant information (e.g., BTC-e.com) about real-world actors and fa-
cilitates the interpretation of monetary flows. The great power of
Bitcoin address attribution lies in its combination with clustering
heuristics: if one can attribute a single address within a cluster
containing hundred of thousands of addresses, one can attribute
the entire cluster. When investigating monetary flows, Bitcoin ex-
changes are of great interest because they are the entry and exit
points of the cryptocurrency ecosystem where fiat currencies (e.g.,
USD, EUR) are converted into cryptocurrencies and vice versa.
3.3 Dataset Expansion Procedure
To expand the seed address dataset, which was obtained as de-
scribed in Section 3.1, we matched the set of seed addresses with
the set of all addresses extracted from the blockchain. This elimi-
nated 100 seed addresses not appearing in the blockchain because
they have not (yet) received ransom payments from victims and
have therefore not been used in a Bitcoin transaction, reducing
our dataset to 7,122 addresses from 38 families. We then expanded
Family Ransomware Start Date Investigation Method
1 Locky 2016-02 Google Trends
2 CryptXXX 2016-04 Google Trends
3 CryptoLocker 2013-09 Google Trends
4 DMALockerv3 2016-01 Google Trends
5 CryptoTorLocker2015 2015-02 Google Trends
6 Globe 2013-04 Google Trends
7 SamSam 2016-01 Google Trends
8 NoobCrypt 2015-12 Manual search
9 EDA2 2015-09 Manual search
10 Flyper 2016-09 Manual search
11 Globev3 2017-01 Manual search
12 JigSaw 2016-04 Google Trends
13 Cryptohitman 2016-05 Google Trends
14 TowerWeb 2016-06 Manual search
15 WannaCry 2017-05 Google Trends
Table 1: Timefilters applied for top 15 ransomware families.
the dataset by linking these seed addresses to their corresponding
clusters in the cluster graph, which was pre-computed through the
multiple-input heuristics. We refer to these addresses as expanded
addresses.
However, if a ransomware author was involved in other activi-
ties that implied Bitcoin transactions before the ransomware cam-
paign, the multiple-input heuristic could result in false positives.
Thus, to ensure that the addresses in the expanded dataset were
related to ransomware activity, we applied a time filter on the ex-
panded dataset by determining a start date of ransomware cam-
paigns. For 25 families, we used the Google trend searches and
extracted the first month in which online searches about the ran-
somware family took place. Google trend searches can be a good
indicator of the beginning of a ransomware campaign because indi-
viduals or organizations hit by a ransomware campaign are likely
to search online to learn more about the threat before they decide
on a course of action. This method was, however, not successful
for 13 ransomware families from which Google trend search did
not have any data. For those cases, we looked for online articles or
blogs on the ransomware family and took the earliest article pub-
lished on the subject, no matter in which language it was written.
Out of the 13 families, we did not find any information on the start
date of three of them because no articles or blogs were published
related to them; they were sometimes only listed as a potential
threat among other ransomware families.
Our final sample contains 7,118 addresses related to 35 ran-
somware families and corresponding time filters (see Table 1). In
the remainder of this paper, due to limited space, the subsequent
tables will display the Top 15 ransomware families8 . Table 2 sum-
marizes the top 15 ransomware families ordered by the number
of addresses in our expanded dataset after application of time fil-
ters (Exp. Addr. (TF)). It also lists the number of collected seed ad-
dresses (Seed Addr.), the number of expanded addresses before time
filtering (Exp. Addr.), and the number of clusters (Clusters) that can
be assigned to each ransomware family. The numbers in Table 2
8The results for the 35 families can be reproduced with the scripts and the datasets
provided in the Github repositories
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Family Seed Addr. Clusters Exp. Addr. Exp. Addr. (TF)
1 Locky 7,038 1 7,094 7,093
2 CryptXXX 1 1 1,742 1,742
3 CryptoLocker 2 1 968 968
4 DMALockerv3 9 3 165 165
5 CryptoTorLocker2015 1 1 159 121
6 Globe 8 2 87 87
7 SamSam 44 11 47 47
8 NoobCrypt 2 1 28 28
9 EDA2 2 2 33 26
10 Flyper 2 1 26 26
11 Globev3 9 3 19 18
12 JigSaw 12 4 17 17
13 Cryptohitman 1 1 14 13
14 TowerWeb 1 1 14 8
15 WannaCry 5 1 6 6
Table 2: Dataset statistics for top 15 ransomware families.
show that the multiple-input heuristics can identify a large num-
ber of Bitcoin addresses related to ransomware attacks. Table 2 also
shows that the seed address distribution is highly skewed.
In the case of Locky, we found that the number of seed ad-
dresses is almost equal to the number of expanded addresses be-
cause the multiple-input heuristic was already computed on the
seed addresses provided by the APWG. Also, the number of Cryp-
toLocker addresses corresponds exactly to the number of addresses
(968) reported by Liao et al. [19] in an earlier study. We take these
observations as a validation of our expansion method and its imple-
mentation. When looking at Table 2, one can observe that time fil-
tering does not eliminate many addresses in the expanded dataset.
This indicates that the multiple-input clustering already delivers
addresses within the expected time frame of each ransomware
campaign.
3.4 Beyond the Clustering Process: Tracing
Outgoing Relationships
The dataset expansion using the multiple-input heuristic points to
new addresses related to ransomware attacks. While investigating
the expanded dataset, we developed a simple method to go beyond
the clustering process and trace monetary flows. Indeed, by focus-
ing on outgoing transactions for one ransomware family, one can
find common addresses receiving money from the expanded ad-
dresses related to that ransomware family.
The method consists of taking into account, for each expanded
address, all the outgoing transactions and their respective out-
puts. With this, an outgoing-relationships graph can be built for
each ransomware family. The nodes in the graph are either the
expanded addresses or the addresses receiving money from the ex-
panded addresses. The edges in the graph illustrate the direction of
the monetary flow. For example, Figure 1 illustrates the outgoing-
relationship graph for the CryptoHitman ransomware family. The
red nodes represent addresses from our expanded address dataset
which belong to the CryptoHitman family and the gray nodes rep-
resent output addresses not in the dataset. The graph shows that
some addresses are key since they receive, more than once, money
from known CryptoHitman addresses. Other gray addresses in the
graph only receive one incoming transaction. They could possibly
be related to theCryptoHitman ransomware, but the information in
Figure 1: CryptoHitman Outgoing-Relationships Graph
the graph is insufficient to allow such conclusion. While the Cryp-
toHitman graph is small enough for visual inspections, other ran-
somware families have large graphs and require automated mech-
anisms to distinguish key addresses. Thus, to automatically dis-
tinguish key addresses in an outgoing-relationships graph, we de-
velop a simple method. For each node, we calculate the number of
incoming relationships in the graph, as expressed in Definition 3.1:
Definition 3.1. The in-degree deд− of a Bitcoin address a is the
sum of all unique incoming relationships of a within the scope of
a family-specific outgoing-relationships graph.
We consider that each node that has deд(a)− ≥ 2, in a family-
specific outgoing-relationships graph, is a key address for this ran-
somware family. Even though some addresses are already in the
dataset while others are not, they are all identified as key addresses
related to the ransomware family.
We computed an outgoing-relationships graph for each family in
the dataset and calculated the metric by applying the above defini-
tion. We found, in total, 2,077 key addresses from the 35 families
studied. Table 3 presents the number of key addresses found with
the outgoing-relationships graph for each family, and shows how
many were already part of our expanded dataset (Key Expanded
Addr.) and how many were added by this method (New Key Addr.).
3.5 Estimating the Lower Bound Financial
Impact of Each Ransomware Family
With the dataset generated through the different steps mentioned
above, an assessment of the minimum direct financial impact of
each ransomware family is possible. The multiple-input clustering
heuristic allowed an expansion of the dataset and the time filtering
ensured that the expanded addresses were within the time frame
of each ransomware campaign. Also, the method of tracing outgo-
ing relationships found key addresses that received money from
the expanded addresses related to a ransomware family. The key
addresses already in the expanded dataset (red nodes) are filtered
out of the expanded dataset for the financial assessment, in order
to avoid double-counting ransom payments.
5
Family New Key Addr. Key Expanded Addr.
1 CryptXXX 488 438
2 Locky 305 266
3 CryptoTorLocker2015 160 37
4 DMALockerv3 53 18
5 Globe 47 38
6 NoobCrypt 43 11
7 SamSam 31 6
8 CryptoLocker 26 24
9 EDA2 16 3
10 JigSaw 16 1
11 Cryptohitman 9 1
12 TowerWeb 9 1
13 Globev3 6 0
14 Flyper 5 3
15 VenusLocker 5 1
Table 3: Key Addresses identified for each family.
4 THE IMPACT OF RANSOMWARE
Building on themethodology presented in the previous section and
the resulting dataset, we can now analyze Bitcoin transactions re-
lated to ransomware. In the following section, we report our find-
ings on tracing ransomware monetary flows. Then, we provide a
lower bound estimation for the direct financial impact of the Top 15
families in our dataset and give insight into the value and longitu-
dinal development of ransomware payments. Lastly, we present an
estimation of the minimum worth of the market for ransomware
payments.
4.1 Following the Money Trace
By computing the outgoing-relationships graph for each ran-
somware family and applying the condition mentioned above, key
addresses for each ransomware family were found. Although the
minimum for an address to be determined as key was to score
deд(a)− ≥ 2, many key addresses had a much higher score. Within
the sample of 2,077 key addresses, the average deд(a)− was 12
(std=27.66) incoming relationships and themedianwas 6. Themax-
imum deд(a)− in the sample went up to 742 incoming relation-
ships. This indicates that ransomware authors do tend to consoli-
date their money into one or several key addresses.
Intuitively, these key addresses can be considered collectors of
a ransomware family. We define a collector as an address used to
collect or aggregate payments from several payment addresses. To
picture the role of a collector, Figure 2 shows the relationships of
a subset of Locky addresses. It illustrates that an address that was
already in the expanded dataset (red node) has a high degree cen-
trality and receives 32 payments of less or equal to 10 BTC. Consid-
ering the high degree centrality, this address can be considered a
collector of the Locky ransomware family. That figure also shows
that the high-degree centrality address sends 67 Bitcoins to a gray
address, which is an address not in the expanded dataset. Similarly,
two other addresses, from the expanded dataset, send 50 Bitcoins
to that gray address. At a higher level, this gray address can also
be considered a collector of the Locky ransomware family.
Figure 2: Locky collector address example.
However, it must be noted that a collector address does not
necessarily belong to the same cluster of a family’s seed and ex-
panded addresses (such as the gray node in Figure 2). This is be-
cause deciding whether an address is a collector or not depends
on the monetary flow in an outgoing-relationships graph related
to a ransomware family and has nothing to do with the multiple-
input heuristic results, which is based on the author having the
private keys of all addresses in the cluster. Indeed, some collector
addresses can rather be part of a larger cluster representing Bitcoin
exchange services or gambling sites, which can be used by attack-
ers to convert ransom payments to fiat currencies or to camouflage
monetary flows.
If a key address belongs to a large known cluster, it could then
be considered the end route of tracing ransomware payments. As
explained before in the methodology, such assessment is possible
by investigating tags associated with addresses and address clus-
ters. We investigated the tags associated to the 2,077 key addresses
and their corresponding clusters in more detail and found 163 key
addresses related to 28 tagged clusters with additional contextual
information. Of these 163 collectors, 86 were related to known
exchanges organizations, such as BTC-e.com, LocalBitcoin.com,
Kraken.com and Xapo.com. Another 47 were related to gambling
sites like SatoshiDice.com, Bitzillions.com, SatoshiMines.com, Bet-
Coin Dice and FortuneJack.com. A total of 12 addresses were linked
to mixing services, such as BitcoinFog.info and Helix Mixer. These
services are specialized intermediaries which mix coins and trans-
actions of different actors and thereby camouflage the digital trace
of cryptocurrency transactions. They play a central role in money
laundering and cybercrime-related activities that rely on cryp-
tocurrencies as a payment method.
Although our information on real-world actors behind ad-
dresses and clusters was limited to the tags we retrieved from ex-
ternal sources and therefore incomplete, we found that some ran-
somware attackers directly sent the ransom payments to known ac-
tors, mostly gambling and exchange services. We also found that
some ransomware families specifically transacted multiple times
with the same actor. For example, 20 CryptoTorLocker2015 key ad-
dresses were related to the SatoshiDice organization and 25 Locky
key addresses were linked to the BTC-e exchange. Also, about 27
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Family Addresses BTC USD
1 Locky 6,827 15,399.01 7,834,737
2 CryptXXX 1,304 3,339.68 1,878,696
3 DMALockerv3 147 1,505.78 1,500,630
4 SamSam 41 632.01 599,687
5 CryptoLocker 944 1,511.71 519,991
6 GlobeImposter 1 96.94 116,014
7 WannaCry 6 55.34 102,703
8 CryptoTorLocker2015 94 246.32 67,221
9 APT 2 36.07 31,971
10 NoobCrypt 17 54.34 25,080
11 Globe 49 33.03 24,319
12 Globev3 18 14.34 16,008
13 EDA2 23 7.1 15,111
14 NotPetya 1 4.39 11,458
15 Razy 1 10.75 8,073
Table 4: Received payments per ransom family (Top 15).
key addresses fromfive ransomware families belonged to the Local-
bitcoin.com9 cluster, which is an exchange that allows individuals
to buy and sell Bitcoins to people who are geographically close.
As extra information, the outgoing-relationships analysis also
linked some families together. It illustrated that the Globe and
Globev3 families sent money to the same untagged collector ad-
dress, which was to be expected based on their shared naming
features, but was confirmed through our methodology. Similarly,
10 key addresses, with a few number of transactions and no tags,
received money from both the TowerWeb and Cryptohitman ad-
dresses. Intuitively, we can assume that these two families might
be related to the same real-world actors who may run two families
of ransomware simultaneously or may launder money on behalf
of the two different groups.
4.2 Lower Bound Direct Financial Impacts
Besides tracing ransomware monetary flows, we assessed the
lower bound financial impact of each ransomware family. The ba-
sis for our estimation was the time-filtered expanded ransomware
dataset described in Section 3.3. In order to avoid double-counting
of ransomware payments, we removed known collector addresses
from the dataset. Table 4 presents the total amount of received
payments for the Top 15 ransomware families in the dataset. It
shows received payments in Bitcoin (BTC), rounded to two decimal
places, and in U.S dollars (USD). We find that the ransomware fam-
ily that generated the largest direct financial impact in our dataset
is Locky, which received payments totalizing USD 7,834,737. The
second ransomware family is CryptXXX with a lower bound di-
rect financial impact of USD 1,878,696, followed by the DMALock-
erv3 ransomware family with USD 1,500,630. Based on our dataset,
these are the three families that created a lower bound direct finan-
cial impact of more than one million. Then, SamSam, Cryptolocker
and GlobeImposter generated lower bound direct financial impacts
9https://localbitcoins.com/about
of hundreds of thousands of dollars each. As we go down the rank-
ing, a rapid decline is observed: the ransomware occupying the
15th position, Razy, barely gathered a lower bound of USD 8,073.
Due to the worth of the Bitcoin being highly volatile, we do
not consider these amounts as representing ransomware revenue.
Indeed, such assumption would assume that ransomware authors
cashed out immediately after receiving victims’ payments, which
may not be the case.
Also, when comparing the amounts above with findings re-
ported in other studies, we observe similarities and discrepancies.
The results for Locky and CryptXXX are consistent with the con-
current research reported in Huang et al. [15] and Bursztein et
al. [4]. These authors found that the Locky ransomware generated
a direct financial impact of approximately USD 7,8 million and the
CryptXXX ransomware approximately USD 1.9 million. However,
there is a discrepancy in the results for CryptoLocker : they esti-
mated that Cryptolocker created roughly USD 2 million in direct
financial impact versus USD 519,991 in our study. Liao et al. [19]
measured CryptoLocker payments from September 2013 until Jan-
uary 2014 and reported a lower bound direct financial impact of
USD 310,472 and an upper bound of USD 539,080, which is much
closer to our result. Yet, the discrepancy seems to come from the ad-
dition of a single additional seed address — disclosed in the Huang
et al. [15] study— that led to an expanded cluster of 3,489 addresses.
This cluster neither appears in our research nor in Liao et al.’s.
Another discrepancy lies in the result, displayed in Bursztein et
al. [4], about the SamSam ransomware: USD 1.9 million for this re-
search against USD 583,498 in this study. The differences may arise
from the different number of seed addresses used in the Bursztein
et al. research. Finally, we identify high or moderate performing
ransomware families, such as DMALockerv3 and NoobCrypt, that
did not register in the concurrent research.
4.3 Inspecting Payments
Figure 3 presents the mean payment per family (and the standard
mean errors) of the Top 15 families. It shows that the incoming
transactions of 12 ransomware families range from very low pay-
ments up to USD 2,000. Three ransomware families have higher
payments on average: DMALockerv3, GlobeImposter and SamSam.
In January 2016, DMALockerv3 was known to ask for ransom pay-
ments of 15 BTC (which was equivalent to $6491.25) [21, 29]. The
SamSam ransomware was also known to ask ransoms based on the
number of machines infected and the ransom could go from 1.7
BTC ($4,600) to decrypt a given machine up to 12 BTC ($32,800)
to decrypt all machines infected [6]. For the GlobeImposter ran-
somware, however, we could not find a justification for the relative
high mean payment value and mean error rate. We only identified
a single address for that ransomware family in our dataset and,
therefore, could not compute means across addresses belonging to
that family.
Figure 4 shows cumulative (red line) and non-cumulative ran-
som payments (blue dots) over time for a selection of four ran-
somware families: Cryptolocker, Locky, SamSam and Wannacry.
For three famous families, CryptoLocker, Locky and Wannacry, it
shows the viral effect of ransomware attacks and ransom pay-
ments. It also illustrates that famous ransomware campaigns are
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Figure 3: Mean payment per family with standard mean er-
rors.
likely to be a short-term, one-time deal, in which a ransomware
author makes money quickly and then stops, possibly due to var-
ious forms of security interventions. However, the SamSam ran-
somware seems to behave differently since the cumulative pay-
ment curve shows a somewhat linear trend over a whole year, from
July 2016 to July 2017. The difference in this campaign could be re-
lated to the different approach used by the ransomware authors,
which is known to be more targeted [6].
4.4 Market for Ransomware Payments
When summing the lower bound direct financial impacts of all 35
families analyzed in our study, we find that, from 2013 to mid-2017,
theminimumworth of themarket for ransom payments represents
USD 12,768,536 (22,967.54 BTC). This means that the Locky ran-
somware accounts for more than 50% of the ransomware payments
and the first three families account for 86% of the market while the
other 32 families share the remaining 12%. These results are simi-
lar to the concurrent research reported in Bursztein et al. [4] and
Huang et al. [15], which also conclude that the ransomwaremarket
is dominated by a few kingpins.
5 DISCUSSION
Overall, we believe that the method presented in this paper led
to novel insights for each ransomware family. Ransom payment
addresses and collectors were differentiated in the dataset, allow-
ing one to assess ransomware lower bound direct financial im-
pacts without double-counting. Plus, we were able to trace mone-
tary flows of ransomware payments and identify destinations, such
as Bitcoin exchanges or gambling services, when contextually re-
lated information (tags) was available. Our method is reproducible
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Figure 4: Longitudinal payment trend per family.
and could be repeated for additional families with an updated seed
dataset. Plus, computation of address clusters over the most recent
state of the Bitcoin blockchain, along with more identification of
clusters belonging to specific groups, could greatly increase the
knowledge on exit points of ransomware monetary flows.
We are well aware that our approach has a number of limita-
tions. First, ourmethodology relies on a set of seed addresses manu-
ally collected and the effectiveness of the multiple-input heuristics
for uncovering previously unknown addresses linked to this fam-
ily. Thus, it misses other ransomware families as well as other ad-
dresses that might belong to the same family, but cannot be linked
to the same cluster. Still, the more addresses from various families
become available, the more accurate the picture of the overall mar-
ket for ransom payments will become. We address this limitation
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by constraining our analysis to “lower bound” direct financial im-
pacts, to ensure we are not claiming to assess the total impacts of a
ransomware family or of the entire market for ransom payments.
Second, our approach is limited by the extent and quality of the
attribution data (tags) available. Without this information, clusters
remain anonymous and inferences about their real-world nature
are impossible. Nevertheless, we believe that such datawill increas-
ingly become available in the near future with the growing popu-
larity of cryptocurrencies and analytics tools.
Third, tumblers or mixing services, which facilitate the amalga-
mation of coins belonging to multiple individuals in a single trans-
action, increase the difficulty of tracing monetary flows in the Bit-
coin network (cf., [24]). We believe that our methodology is robust
to such services because it only considers payments to addresses
derived from a manually collected set of ransomware payment ad-
dresses and their direct outgoing neighbors in the address graph.
Thus, in the worst case, a key address would represent the entry
point of a mixing service.
We also note that the transactions we attribute to ransomware
families could be part of CoinJoin transactions . However, we argue
that matching transactions with those of other users when collect-
ing ransom payments would add an undesirable third party (the
CoinJoin service) dependency in the process. This should hardly
be implemented in practice as using CoinJoin services to collect
ransoms would also create delays in payments and certainly cause
considerable technical efforts for ransomware attackers. This as-
sumption is somehow confirmed by Huang et al. [15], who applied
known CoinJoin detection heuristics on their dataset and did not
find such transactions.
Despite these limitations, we have shown that one can uncover
valuable insights into ransomware payments and the market val-
ues of these attacks. Through the analysis of 35 ransomware fam-
ilies in the Bitcoin network, we find that there are some clear in-
equalities in the market, which could be considered as a top-heavy
market in which only a few players are responsible for most of the
ransom payments. This is also in line with the concurrent research
reported in Huang et al. [15] and Burzstein et al. [4]. Such finding
has implications for law enforcement agencies seeking to disrupt
this market: mobilizing their limited resources on a small number
of highly capable players could lead to takedowns and have amajor
(negative) impact on the ransomware economy.
Moreover, when masking major ransomware families, such as
Locky, CryptXXX and DMALockerv3, the drop in ransom amounts
is substantial and we find that more than half of the ransomware
family in the sample is responsible for less than USD 8,000 of di-
rect financial impacts. Kharraz et al. [17] who studied 1,359 sam-
ples from 15 ransomware families and Gazet [10], who reversed-
engineered 15 ransomware samples, both found that most ran-
somware families used superficial and flawed techniques to en-
crypt files. Few of them had actual destructive capabilities and
most of them could be easily defeated. This could explain why only
few ransomware families succeed at generating ransom payments
worth millions.
Such observations do not mean that the ransomware threat
should be underestimated. Although the minimum worth of the
market for ransom payments, taking into account 35 families, is a
relatively modest amount (about USD 12 million) compared to the
hype surrounding the issue, the overall direct and indirect dam-
ages they caused to individual and organizational victims aremuch
higher [2]. Yet, there is not doubt that initiatives developed by the
community to prevent ransomware attacks [16, 33, 35], as well as
the initiative "NoMore Ransom!"10, thatmake ransomware decryp-
tion tools available to victims, can have a positive impact on lim-
iting ransom payments. Some of the ransomware families in our
datasets have decryption tools available on this community web-
site. Although this could explain why some families do not have a
large direct financial impact, further analysis should look into the
performance changes of a ransomware family once a decryption
tool is made available.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We present a novel method for identifying and gathering infor-
mation on Bitcoin transactions related to illicit activity. We imple-
ment this method on-top-of the GraphSense open-source platform
and apply it to empirically analyze transactions related to 35 ran-
somware families. We estimate the lower bound direct financial
impact of each ransomware family and find that, from 2013 to mid-
2017, the market for ransomware payments has a minimum worth
of USD 12,768,536 (22,967.54 BTC). We also find that the market
is highly skewed, dominated by a few number of players. From
these findings, we conclude that the total ransom amounts gath-
ered through ransomware attacks are relatively low compared to
the hype surrounding this issue.
We believe that our simple data-driven methodology and find-
ings provide valuable insights and carry implications for secu-
rity companies, government agencies and the public in general. It
could, for instance, be adopted in threat intelligence systems for
following ransomware payments associated with new campaigns
in real time, and for identifying inflection points such as explosive
growth phases and slowdown periods, when the plateau of ransom
payments is reached.
An evidence-based and more granular longitudinal tracking of
the entire ransomware economy would allow government agen-
cies and security companies to fine-tune their intervention efforts
and awareness campaigns to focus on the two or three most ac-
tive and dynamic threats. In other words, by making more reli-
able, comprehensive, and timely information available on the na-
ture and scope of the ransomware problem, our methodology can
help lead the discussion on how best to address the threat at scale
and support subsequent decision-making.
One straightforward future work would be to extend our anal-
ysis to additional ransomware families. Work in that direction
should also take into account the emergence of post-Bitcoin cryp-
tocurrencies, such as Monero, Ethereum or Zcash, that have ad-
vanced privacy features and are gaining popularity in the digital
underground [8]. Kirk is the first ransomware family that has been
reported to use Monero for ransom payments [1].
Another possible area of future work lies in the application of
this methodology on other illicit activities that channel their fi-
nancial transactions through the Bitcoin network, such as other
extortion cases, trafficking of illicit goods or money laundering.
10https://www.nomoreransom.org/
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Since Bitcoin is nowadays "accounting for over 40% of all identi-
fied criminal-to-criminal payments" and cryptocurrencies seem to
"[...] establish themselves as single common currency for cyber-
criminals[...]" [7], there are plenty of application areas for such a
method.
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